The verdict, in the recent assembly election in the state of Bihar, has attracted a lot of interest across India. The ruling coalition of Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)), and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), won a record 85% of the seats, 206 seats in a house of 243. Did this huge margin of victory, signify a major shift in Indian politics? Is the political agenda in India being reshaped? What does this election really tell us about the future political direction in India?
In Part 1, I look at the implication and impact of the Bihar assembly election, here.
In this the second part of the two part article, I try to look back at Indian politics, attempt to identify the various strands that dominated politics at one point in time or another - language, region, religion, caste, and find that there is a diminishing political return from various shades of identity politics that has set in. With identity politics in decline, could political ideology find a legitimate space in India?
Part 2: Evolution of Politics in India
In the first 15 years after Independence, politics was dominated by the identity of languages, and the states were reorganized along broadly linguistic lines.
In the next 15 years, poverty became the dominant element of political discourse, cutting across various social fracture lines, and encompassing different identities. During this phase, with nationalization of major industries such as banks, energy and oil, textile, etc, India entered a decidedly socialist era. But increased economic control, along with the first oil price shock, led inevitably to political discontent.
Consequently, in the historic election in the aftermath of the ‘Emergency’, in 1977, the INC lost power at the national level for the first time. As the world watched, India became the first major democracy in a developing country to undergo constitutional transfer of power from one party to another. This was an event of enormous political significance, empowering people, and entrenching democracy.
But the parties that formed the new government, pursued the socialistic economic vision with even greater rigour, and with the second oil price shock of 1979, inflation touched 20% per annum, and the fate of the first non-Congress government in Delhi was sealed.
In the 1980s, while the INC regained power, and took some tentative steps to reform the economy, the country was almost torn apart by various sectarian movements. Bolstered by socialistic attempt to re-distribute wealth, various political parties experimented with identity politics of caste, religion, and region, in the hope of capturing the organs of the state. The separatist movements in Punjab and Assam gathered steam. A lot of blood was spilled throughout the 1980s, including the assassination of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards.
At the same time, various caste groups attempted to organize and mobilize politically, particularly in north India. In an attempt to politically consolidate some of the backward castes, a sweeping policy of reservation or affirmative action was proposed.
On the other hand, another kind of identity politics raised its head. Hindu fundamentalists were already apprehensive of appeasement of religious minorities such as Muslims, for electoral gain by the INC. Now the same forces became concerned about social fragmentation on caste lines, and sought to unite the Hindu majority of India in to a cogent political force.
By the 1990s, while the separatists and secessionist movements had by and large been controlled, the caste and religious polarization completely fragmented Indian polity. This necessarily ushered in a new era of coalition politics, and for the first time, Indian politics became really competitive, for the first time. With people experiencing diverse political options, routinely threw out the ruling side. This has been described as the anti-incumbency syndrome. A point came, when a sitting legislator had barely 30% chance of getting re-elected.
Indian politics was again transformed. For the first time political parties sensed an opportunity to gain power by winning election, and by the same token feared the very real danger of losing power as well.
It is in this tumultuous political environment of the 1990s, when political uncertainty prevailed, that India began to reform her economy in a big way. This defied conventional wisdom that political uncertainty will lead to an uncertain economic outlook.
It is precisely this political uncertainty which made the political leaders and parties look for policies to improve governance and the economic performance, in the hope of winning the favour of the voters.
Policies became a subject of discourse out of sheer political necessity in an extremely competitive political environment. Just as competition improves the economic efficiency, political competition sustained the search for policies that might improve the prospect of getting re-elected.
As India’s economic growth increased gradually from 6% in the 1990s, to 8% and then 9% in the mid-2000s, politics of performance became a significant factor in elections.
The second significant consequence of increased political competition was the diminishing returns of earlier identity politics. While politicians tasted power riding their favourite identity, be it caste or religion, the voters began to relish the prospect of political competition, and explore ways to force the political parties to perform.
The BSP, the party of the most oppressed castes, had made its mark on Indian politics by rabidly polarizing caste opinon, and mobilizing and consolidating its targeted caste groups. It came close to political power in UP, propelled by narrow identity of its caste base. Yet, it had to rely on the support of other parties representing other caste groups, in order to cobble up the coalition with necessary numbers in the legislature. These experiments continued throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, and each time such coalition of expediency was quite short lived.
It is then, that the BSP, the party of extremely narrowly defined caste groups, realized the need to broad base its political appeal if it had to have any realistic chance of securing political power in UP. With no caste group enjoying more than 20% share of the population, there was little possibility of any party being able to secure political power on its own. For over two years, BSP went about transforming itself from the party of the Dalits, to the party of all, particularly the poor, appealing to virtually every section of Indian society, caste and religions. While the other major parties in UP sought to consolidate their voter base, BSP was the only one that attempted to expand its base to other groups.
In the UP assembly election of 2007, BSP reaped the benefit broad basing its appeal. Defying all predictions, it won the assembly election on its own, and gained political power in India’s largest state.
After 1977, when INC lost the national election for the first time, and the1990s, when Indian politics became truly competitive, the UP assembly election, of 2007, is perhaps the most politically significant event in India. For it showed the limits of identity politics, and established the political reason for broad basing politics.
Real significance of Bihar election of 2010
The assembly election in Bihar, in 2005, also exposed the limits of identity politics. For 15 years, RJD leader Lalu Prasad enjoyed unquestioned political authority in the state. Yet, he failed to grasp the political reality. While he tried to consolidate his traditional support base, but his almost complete failure to maintain basic law and order, and governance, meant that his voters were growing increasingly dissatisfied.
One of the biggest advantage of the first past the post election system is that even a small shift in support base can bring in big electoral dividend in terms of seats. This greatly increases the prospect of new political entrants to make their mark.
In 2005, in Bihar, as RJD’s political fortune was fraying, its main coalition partners, the INC, and another local party, Lok Janshakti Party (LJP), moved away. As his vote base got divided, the coalition of JD(U) and BJP gained the upper hand, and captured political power.
The election in Bihar, in 2010, only reconfirms the basic thrust of this analysis. Increased political competition, inevitably diminishes the political returns of identity politics as voters begin to relish the greater range of political choices. Consequently, parties are forced to look at ways of improving their performance in governance.
Indians typically have multiple identities in terms of caste, language, religion and region, and the voters are increasingly aware of the advantage of switching their identity to take political advantage of the situation.
This is a fundamental lesson which Mr Kumar, the leader of JD(U) and BJP coalition in Bihar took to heart. Realising the fickleness of identity politics, he opted to improve governance as a way to appeal to broad section of voters beyond any particular identity. He moderated the caste based appeal of many in his own party, and convinced his coalition partner, the BJP, to moderate their Hindu religious agenda.
At the same time, since identity loyalties are not permanent, as his predecessor from RJD had learned at a high political cost, Mr Kumar embarked on basic governance issues. This allowed his coalition to increase their vote share by only 5%, getting about 39% of the vote in 2010 election, but ending up winning 85% of the seats. The major opposition combine of RJD and LJP, secured 25% of the votes, but only 10% of the seats. The INC, which increased its votes by 2% to 8%, won just 4 seats in 2010, compared to 9 seats in 2009.
Prospect for Liberal Politics in India
With identity politics running out of steam, and distributive politics failing to keep up with the rapidly rising aspiration of Indians today, the need for governance and development have clearly emerged on the political agenda.
This is the first time in the 60 years of Indian democracy, that the prospect of policies that boost performance of government and the economic sectors are likely to get prime attention, out of sheer necessity of political survival in the extremely competitive world of Indian politics. This implies that policies would have to be formulated with much greater care, and these would have to be politically viable. And since the ordinary voter is not a policy expert, the only way to get the message out to the voter is by narrating the policy proposals to the public through the filter of political ideologies.
Again, for the first time in the history of democratic India, political parties have the need to adopt a coherent ideology in order to explain the intricacies of policies to its voters. So far, Indian politics have been largely devoid of ideology. All parties tended to adopt the dominant ideology of the day, since their distinctive feature was identity. Ideology was only seen as a providing a veneer to mask the base identities to which the political parties traditionally appealed to.
But with increasing significance of political performance for survival of political parties, policies are coming to the centre stage. To make policies politically accessible to mass audiences, political ideology will necessarily have to be developed. With diminishing returns from identity politics, political ideology will emerge from the shadows to the forefront.
For liberals in India, this is a once in a life time opportunity. For all these years, liberals were devoted to their political ideals, but found very few takers. The liberals were either swepat away by identity politics of one kind or the other, or their ideological roots were seen as politically irrelevant, in an environment where ideologies were not needed to differentiate different political parties.
Today, with the demise of identity politics, and rise of the need for political ideology to distinguish themselves from one another, the political environment seems opportune for a liberal renaissance in India. Are the Indian liberals ready to seize their moment under the Indian sky!
This is the real significance of the Bihar assembly election. It has reconfirmed the focus on governance that had emerged over the past decade, while also confirming the limits of identity politics.
Indian democracy has always been very vocal, voluble and full of colour. Yet, one of the most startling features of democracy in India has been the near complete consensus on the core political beliefs of the day, among most of the political parties.
Over the past century, as political freedom expanded around the world, so too did economic freedom. Almost all the rich countries of today are democracies. While the poor and developing countries are not typically characterized by their weak democratic political institutions. India has been a proud exception to that narrative.
India retained her constitutional democratic republican character right through the past six decades. But for the first time, with political competition facilitating an environment for economic growth and improved governance, out of sheer political necessity, the prospect of India actually joining the ranks of those countries that are economically free, politically democratic, and enjoying the highest standards of life seem to be a distinct possibility.